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Obscenity on the Internet: Nationalizing the
Standard to Protect Individual Rights
by SARAH KAGAN*
Introduction
In its October 28, 2009, decision in United States v. Kilbride,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that courts
should apply a "national community standard" when evaluating
whether speech transmitted online or through e-mail is obscene.'
This case marks the first time that a circuit court has called for a
national obscenity standard. The idea has been floated by a handful
of Justices on the Supreme Court; however, it has never commanded
a majority of the Court.3 Historically, district and circuit courts have
widely avoided "venturing into the uncharted waters of a national
obscenity standard."4 The Ninth Circuit's opinion, however, raises
the following questions: 1) What is a national obscenity standard? and
2) How would one be created and applied? The Ninth Circuit left
these questions unanswered. This note is intended to begin to
address those questions and highlight areas where greater empirical
research is needed. Part I of this note is an introduction to obscenity
laws and their development. Part II addresses the technological
developments necessitating the imposition of a national standard for
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2011, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., 2007, Legal Studies and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. The
author would like to thank Professor Ash Bhagwat for his thoughtful suggestions and
guidance throughout the drafting process. The author would also like to thank her parents
for raising her in a home that valued and nurtured intellectual curiosity, and her sisters for
their unwavering love and support.
1. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 1250.
3. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
4. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.
1979).
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Internet communications. Part III will address the relevant national
community as well as current research on the definition of obscenity.
Part IV will address the First Amendment issues raised by the current
standard as well as the potential issues for free speech under a
national obscenity standard. Part V will discuss what a national
obscenity standard might look like as well as mechanisms to ensure
that a national standard is applied consistently.
I. The Development of Obscenity Laws
While the First Amendment generally prohibits government
restriction of free speech,' this First Amendment protection has long
been held not to apply to speech that is obscene.' Creating a
sufficiently clear and lasting definition of what qualifies as obscene
has presented significant difficulty for the courts.
A. The Evolution of the Obscenity Standard
Early common law tests for obscenity, such as the "Hicklin test,"'
declared any material containing even an isolated passage that would
offend a "particularly susceptible" member of society to be obscene.'
The Supreme Court refused to adopt the Hicklin test because of the
test's reliance on the standard of particularly sensitive persons.'o The
Court reasoned in Roth v. United States that the particularly
susceptible person standard might encompass material legitimately
dealing with sex-related issues and therefore had to be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of speech and press freedoms." The
Court thus exhibited a preference for a test that would enforce
prevailing societal values rather than the sensitivities of isolated
perspectives.
In Miller v. California,2 the Supreme Court provided what it
called "concrete guidelines" to isolate pornography from other forms
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476,484-85 (1957).
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
8. See Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 Q.B. 360 (Eng.).
9. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
10. Id. at 489.
11. Id.
12. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
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of expression." The Miller test has withstood challenge for almost
thirty years and is still in use today. The test contains three prongs,
each of which must be satisfied for a work to fall under an obscenity
statute.14 The Miller test consists of the following guidelines for the
trier of fact:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Thus, the jury must decide whether the work appeals to the
prurient interest. Then, the jury must decide whether the work
portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive way." Finally, the
court determines whether the work as a whole lacks serious artistic,
political, or other value." In Miller, the Court also addressed the
question of whether to apply national or local community standards.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger declared the United
States too large and diverse to permit the use of a unified national
standard." Since the Miller "contemporary community standards"
language did not establish national obscenity standards, exactly what
size or kind of community served as the source of the standards
remained undetermined.20
In Hamling v. United States,2' the Supreme Court said the
"contemporary community standards" factor, as applied to content
transmitted through the mail, did not require a factfinder to consider
a "precise geographical area."2 2 However, Hamling held that a juror
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
15. Id.
16. Roman A. Kostenko, Are 'Contemporary Community Standards' No Longer
Contemporary?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 105, 111 n.36 (2001).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 112.
19. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
20. See Rieko Mashima, Problem of the Supreme Court's Obscenity Test Concerning
Cyberporn: Community Standards Remaining After ACLU v. Reno, 16(11) THE
COMPUTER LAWYER 23, 23 (1999).
21. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
22. Id. at 105.
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should consider the issue on the basis of "knowledge of the
community or vicinage from which he comes."3 Hamling also
addressed the issue of whether the use of local community standards
renders the Miller test unconstitutional because it subjects nationwide
distributors of printed materials to the various and unpredictable
standards of every community through which the materials may
pass.24  The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that such
nationwide distributors should be held to national, rather than local,
standards, and likewise refused to adopt Justice William J. Brennan's
opinion that to convict the petitioners under a local standards test
would deny them due process of law.25 The Court instead held that
local community standards apply not only to persons based in a local
area, who have reason to know of the local standards, but also to
persons who operate from a distance and are unaware of the local
standards.26
In Pope v. Illinois, the Supreme Court clarified that "the first and
second prongs of the Miller test-appeal to prurient interest and
patent offensiveness-are issues of fact for the jury to determine
applying contemporary community standards."2 7 However, as for the
third prong, "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member
of any given community would find serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a
reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a
whole."'
In Ashcroft v. ACL U,29 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Child Online Privacy Act ("COPA")" and
23. Id.
24. Id. at 106.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 581 (2002).
27. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987). In Hamling v. United States, the Court
noted that a "community" was not any "precise geographic area," and suggested that it
might be less than an entire state. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974). In
Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court approved a "trial court's instructions directing jurors to
apply 'community standards' without specifying what 'community."' Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
28. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01.
29. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 579.
30. The Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") prohibits commercial displays of
sexually explicit materials that are harmful to minors on the World Wide Web, with the
exclusion of materials having serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (1994) (corresponds to the Communications Act of 1934,
§ 231(e)(6)).
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concluded that, by itself, the statute's reliance on community
standards about what material is harmful to minors did not make the
statute substantially overbroad. The Court reaffirmed prior holdings
that obscene speech falls outside of protected speech freedoms,3 ' and
that the use of contemporary community standards in determining
what speech is obscene does not, by itself, render a federal statute
unconstitutional, 32 even if publishers of obscene materials are
required to abide by the standards of disparate communities. A
plurality of the Supreme Court recognized that "Web publishers
currently lack the ability to limit access to their sites on a geographic
basis," and that therefore the use of community standards to define
"obscenity" "would effectively force all speakers on the Web to abide
by the 'most puritan' community's standards."' Nevertheless, the
plurality found that use of community standards "does not by itself
render" a statute unconstitutional. It noted that distributors of such
materials are not dismissed from compliance with community
standards because they use the Internet, a medium that broadcasts
information to virtually every community in the country." The
plurality further stated that COPA's test for determining whether
material is harmful to minors was modeled on the well-established
Miller test (which includes both a "serious value" and a "prurient
interest" prong to narrow the applicability of community standards),
and the mere use of community standards did not render the statute
overbroad."
The majority was not overwhelming in number; at most, five
Justices joined some points of the decision, while other points were
decided by a mere plurality of three.3 ' The opinion is followed by
three concurring opinions and one dissent.3 ' However, six Justices
thought that a national standard might be needed in light of new
technology.' Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that the
31. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 574.
32. Id. at 584-85.
33. Id. at 581.
34. Id. at 577.
35. Id. at 585 (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 583.
37. Id. at 578-85 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
38. Id. at 565-66.
39. See id. at 586-612.
40. Id. at 585 (plurality opinion).
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Court's precedents did not rule out adoption of a national standard.4 1
Indeed, she stated that a national obscenity standard, when applied to
the Internet in particular, would be reasonable in light of the
admitted absence of any great disparity even between the most and
least restrictive communities' interpretations of what would qualify as
obscene under COPA.42 A national standard is also desirable because
it would prevent overburdening Internet content providers with the
task of attempting to limit access to their materials.43 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor concluded that reasonable regulation of the Internet
mandated adoption of a nationwide community standard."
Justice Stephen Breyer's concurrence focused on Congress's
stated purpose of creating a community standard encompassing all of
the nation's adults.45 By enforcing Congress's intent, he noted,
conflicts with the First Amendment could be avoided because the
most puritan communities would not be given the "heckler's Internet
veto."* Applying a national standard would prevent any special need
for First Amendment analysis, because the constitutional problems
associated with the use of local standards would be avoided entirely.47
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, found it impossible to decide whether the use of
community standards would ultimately invalidate the statute until the
scope of all the other provisions had been assessed.48 He noted that
because the Internet is a new and unique medium, prior obscenity
regulation holdings were not necessarily analogous. 49 Thus, in total,
six members of the Court found that a national standard may be
needed, and five concurring opinions viewed the national standard as
41. Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 586. Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Miller, the Court conceded that a
community standard could exist covering the entire state of California, one of the largest
and most demographically diverse states. Id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 589-91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
46. Id. By use of the term "heckler's Internet veto," Justice Breyer no doubt meant
that just as a lone, opinionated critic in the audience at a public debate should not be
allowed to force his or her perspective on the rest of the attendees by use of veto power;
so also should no single community, alone in its discontent, be empowered to deny the rest
of the nation access to materials otherwise considered acceptable.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 592-93.
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not likely posing the same threats to the First Amendment as the
current community-based test.
B. The Kilbride Decision
The Kilbride0 case involves the appeal of the criminal
convictions of two spammers, Jeffrey Kilbride and James Schaffer,
who distributed two sexually explicit images via e-mail throughout
the United States." The defendants' spam operation was enormous
and generated approximately 662,000 complaints to the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") from persons around the country.5 2 The
defendants were ultimately charged with violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1037(a)(3) through fraud in connection with electronic mail and of
two Federal obscenity laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465, which
prohibit the importation into the United States, and the
transportation in interstate commerce, of "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
or filthy" books, pictures, and other media.53
In Kilbride, the district court instructed the jury that the
obscenity test from Miller could be applied on the basis of standards
of "society at large, or people in general."5 4 The court said a precise
geographic area would not define the relevant community and that
jurors could consider their own experiences and judgment." On
appeal, the defendants argued that those instructions were erroneous
because, under Hamling, the court should have told the jurors to
apply standards of their local communities." In the alternative, they
asserted, because the content at issue was sent via e-mail, Hamling
did not apply and instructions should have referred to a national
community.1 The Ninth Circuit held that because people using e-
mail to transmit possibly obscene works cannot control where those
works are received, applying Hamling's location-specific standard
would subject all messages to standards of the least tolerant
community." The Ninth Circuit cited Ashcroft v. American Civil
50. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
51. Id. at 1244.
52. Id. at 1245.
53. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462(a) & 1465.
54. Id. at 1249 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1247.
57. Id. at 1250.
58. Id.
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Liberties Union,S9 as most directly addressing the obscenity issue in
Kilbride. As discussed above in section I.A., in Ashcroft there was no
single rationale explaining the result, however the Ninth Circuit
distilled from the five assenting opinions a holding on the narrowest
grounds."0 The five Justices concurring in the judgment viewed the
application of a national community standard as not or likely not
posing the same concerns as the application of community standard in
defining obscenity on the Internet."
As a result, the Ninth Circuit found a national community
standard for obscenity to be the appropriate standard to apply.62 With
regard to the defendants however, the Court found that there was no
plain error, because the standard of the relevant community was not
"clear and obvious."63 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the
district court had committed no reversible error in its jury
instructions.' The Ninth Circuit's decision may have provided
temporary closure to the case; however, it opened up a can of legal
worms for practitioners and individuals who may someday face
prosecutions for obscenity. The Ninth Circuit did not broach the
subject of whether true consensus on the definition of obscenity
exists, what a national obscenity standard would look like, or how a
jury would apply a national obscenity standard.
II. The Nature of the Internet Has Made Local Standards for
Speech Impracticable.
Current obscenity law was developed, for the most part, in the
1970s. The problem we encounter today is due in part to the fact that
the Court in the time of Miller could not envision the amorphous and
viral nature of the Internet. Today there are many more ways to
communicate from person to person." The Internet has become an
59. Id. at 1252 (internal citations omitted).
60. Id. at 1253; see, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.")
61. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 585.
62. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255.
63. Id. (quoting United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)).
64. Id.
65. The Pew Research Center's Internet & American Life Project's latest research on
the effects of the Internet and cell phones on people's relationship to information and
each other found that: seventy-five percent of adults use the Internet, eighty percent of
adults own a cell phone. Further, fifty-seven percent of online adults use social
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integral part of people's daily lives. People communicate through e-
mail and social networking sites, they shop online, do their banking
online, and even read their daily newspaper online. The Internet has
also allowed for individuals to access sexually explicit images from
practically anywhere a signal can be obtained." In December 2009,
there were approximately 234,372,000 Internet users in the United
States.17 From 2000-2009 the number of users in North America
increased 145.8%.6
The notion of a designated community seems antiquated in the
digital era, particularly when material can be produced in one part of
the world or nation and then, in the blink of an eye, be sold and
transferred automatically, from one site to another, finally ending up
in a third locale. Internet activities, such as e-mail, blogging, and the
use of social networking websites have been associated with larger
and more diverse personal networks. 69 The Internet has the ability to
foster communities. Its wide availability enables geographically,
culturally, and socially distant people to find one another and form
relationships online. However, the Internet's decentralized and open
architecture has also made laws dealing with communications over
the Internet based on geographic boundaries largely impracticable. 70
In cyberspace, user anonymity permits individuals to travel from site
networking websites, and sevety-three percent of online teens use them. Lee Rainie,
Networked Individuals: How They are Reshaping Social Life and Learning Environments,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/Presentations/2010/
AprlUniversity-of-Connecticut-Library-Forum.aspx.
66. Jo Best, Cell Phone Porn To Ring Up $3.3 Billion, SILICON.COM ZDNET NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2006), http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-150416.html.
67. See INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/statsl4.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010). The North American Statistics were updated as of December
31, 2009, and the information comes mainly from the data published by Nielsen Online,
International Telecommunication Union, and other reliable sources.
68. Id.
69. Shanyang Zhao, Do Internet Users Have More Social Ties? A Call for
Differentiated Analyses of Internet Use, 11(3) J. OF COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM. 8
(2006) (social users of the internet have more social ties than non-users do); see also,
Charles Steinfield, Nicole B. Ellison & Cliff Lampe, Social Capital, Self-Esteem, and Use
of Online Social Network Sites, 29 J. OF APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 434 (2008)
(finding social networking websites help reduce barriers that lower self-esteem students
might experience in forming the kinds of large, heterogeneous networks that are sources
of bridging social capital).
70. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the Internet creates a new sphere
of human activity by cutting across territorial borders, thereby undermining the
practicability of laws based on geographic boundaries).
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to site with very few boundaries." The methods of transmission of
information available in cyberspace may have no precise real-world
counterparts, making traditional legal standards and their
enforcement difficult.72
Modern means of communication affect local community
standards, because "[c]ommunications technologies change
relationships of time and space," such that geographical barriers have
less impact." "Just as the physical and political geography of this
country has created physical communities, neighborhoods, cities, and
regions, each with common interests and goals, shared experiences
and interlocking relationships among its residents so has cyberspace
allowed the emergence of virtual communities.",4 The introduction of
outside communications adds state, national, and global flavors and
accents to community discussions. Introducing influences from across
the country into small or large communities is antithetical to the idea
of "local" standards because as national views enter the discussion,
they shift the midpoint in community consensus." The more outside
influence is introduced into the community, the less "local" a
standard becomes.
The reality of the modern communications age is that no
community exists as an island unto itself, able to maintain its own set
of morals completely separate from those of other communities." At
the core of the dilemma is the fact that the Internet has no obvious
borders within which to define a geographic community. The
application of an international standard is an option; however,
problems necessarily arise when countries differ, as they will, in their
respective definitions of obscenity. The empirical research proposed
71. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
887-88 (1996).
72. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1676-77 (1995)
(advising legislators and judges to use caution in regulating the Internet, due to its unique
qualities).
73. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., RURAL AMERICA AT THE
CROSSROADS: NETWORKING FOR THE FUTURE 60 (1991).
74. William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to
the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 198 (1995).
75. Howard Rheingold, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 174-75 (2000).
76. See Kenneth J. Gergen, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN
CONTEMPORARY LIFE (2001).
77. While an international standard would provide for international suppliers, the
same benefits of notice and protection that a national standard does, the international and
[Vol. 38:1242
below in section III.C could be applied to an international Internet
user population; however, for the purposes of this paper, and for
purposes of focusing on the Kilbride proposal, this paper only
addresses a national standard.
III. Does a National Consensus on the Definition of Obscenity
Exist?
It is commonplace in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence that, in the words of its 1975 opinion in Southeast
Promotions v. Conrad, "[e]ach medium of expression... must be
assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it,
for each may present its own problems.", 8  The "problem" with
regulating indecent speech on the Internet, as shown in the
Supreme Court's opinions in Ashcroft v. ACLU and Reno v.
ACLU, is the conflict arising from the application of a local
community standard to a medium whose geographic scope of
distribution cannot be limited to exclude communities that might
object to certain kinds of content.7 ' To solve this problem, the
Ninth Circuit stated that it was persuaded to join Justices
O'Connor and Breyer in holding that "a national community
standard must be applied in regulating obscene speech on the
Internet, including obscenity distributed via email."" However a
new standard presents new issues. The first issue is how to define
the relevant community. Here, the Ninth Circuit has called for the
use of a national community, which could mean one of two things.
First, that a juror would apply the aggregate community standard
of individuals from San Francisco, California, to Provo, Utah. Or
comparative law analysis of differing obscenity standards falls outside of the scope of this
paper. Further, those who supply the United States with pornographic material avail
themselves of the market and could therefore be prosecuted under a United States-based
national standard as well. By unifying Internet obscenity into a national standard for the
United States, it would inevitably provide greater guidance for local and international
producers than the current community standards-based scheme.
78. Southeast Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); see also Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997); Red Lion Broad. Co. Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969).
79. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 575, 595-96 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78.
80. United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009).
81. A 2005 study done by the Bay Area Center for Voting Research, a nonpartisan
group, found that Provo, Utah is the most conservative city in the United States. BAY
AREA CENTER FOR VOTING RESEARCH, Study Ranks America's Most Liberal and
Conservative Cities, http://govpro.com/content/gov-imp-31439 (last visited Sep. 27, 2010).
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second, the aggregate community standard of Internet users in the
United States would be applied. The next issue faced by the
"national community standard" is the lack of empirical research
completed on the matter to accurately assess how the relevant
community feels.
A. What Is the Relevant National Community?
The Miller justification for a local community standard was that
the nation was too expansive and too diverse to expect a single
standard.2 The current local standard was implemented because, at
the time, communities all over the country had different tastes and
values.' With modern technology, people communicate and interact
with other people from all over the country instantaneously as if the
country were one single community, thereby diminishing the past
perceived need for local community standards. Further, other courts
have recognized the practicality and validity of community defined by
non-geographic factors.'
Computer technologies allow individuals to create unique
communities of people with no geographical boundaries."
Accordingly, communications through this medium should not be
judged by communities with geographical boundaries. Users
82. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court stated that application of the
Miller test is a question of fact to be decided by a jury in the location where trial is
brought. The Court further stated that the United States is too big and too diverse to have
a single standard. While the court system historically permits triers of fact to draw on the
standards of their community, requiring states to structure obscenity proceedings around a
national "community standard" would be impractical. See id. "People in different States
vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity." Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 33.
84. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). Courts have also tailored
the standard to comply with the specific community affected. For example, military courts
apply a military community standard in Internet pornography cases, thereby recognizing
community beliefs based upon a nongeographic form of community. See United States v.
Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 581 (A.F. Crim. App. 1995) (recognizing validity of military
community standard).
85. See Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework
for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1083, 1086 (1996) (addressing the ease of access and distribution of information on the
Internet). Further development of the Internet will change "forever the way people live,
work, and interact with each other" as more and more people access the vast network of
information to communicate, bank, invest, buy, sell, or entertain themselves. The National
Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49025-01, 1993 WL 365171
(Sept. 21, 1993) Internet users can access numerous services, including e-mail, discussion
groups, interactive classes, magazines, and newspapers.
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interacting via e-mail and chat rooms may not know where an
individual is geographically. Internet users communicate with other
users from all over the world from the privacy of their own home;
and, in the case of laptops and web-enabled cellular phones,
anywhere they happen to be at the moment.
Implicit in the community standards approach is the notion that a
community relies upon the proximity of its members.' The proper
community standard for purposes of e-mail and the Internet should
be a standard designed specifically for the unique nature and
attributes of the Internet. This standard would apply only to the
Internet domain, and Internet users would determine what is
considered obscene material for purposes of the Internet. The
American users of the Internet should comprise the community for
the national community standards test.'
B. Obscenity and Pornography-What Are We Looking At?
Obscenity is not synonymous with pornography, as most
pornography is not legally obscene; that is, most pornography is
protected by the First Amendment." However, most obscenity cases
deal with pornography that is being prosecuted as obscene. To be
obscene, pornography must, at a minimum, "depict or describe
patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct."89 The first prong of
the Miller test requires the depiction at issue to appeal to the prurient
interest."
In a legal sense, obscenity denotes criminality, and its cultural
connotation is lower-class vulgarity. If a representation transgresses
against sexual norms (that themselves change), courts may judge it
obscene. In a more general sense, the meaning of the term
"pornography" constantly shifts along a continuum moving between
86. See supra section II, discussion about an international versus a national Internet
standard. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (implicit in the community
standards approach is the notion that a "community" relies upon the physical proximity of
its members).
87. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489; see also Frederick B. Lim, Obscenity and Cyberspace:
Community Standards in an On-Line World, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291, 294
(1996).
88. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
89. Id. at 27.
90. The Court's definition of "prurient" is "material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts." Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. To show that the interest is not simply in
"normal, healthy sexual desires," the interest must be shown to be a "shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498
(1985) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20).
Fall 2010]1 245
two concepts: the erotic and the obscene. For example, a
representation once considered obscene, such as a public kiss, can
become so widespread that taboos against it weaken, and it
eventually passes into the realm of the commonplace. Indeed,
research on community standards in general has found that
community standards change over time; they may change from
lenient to harsh to lenient again over the years."
The problem, of course, is that not everyone uses the same
measurements. Some Americans believe that sex is sanctioned only
by marriage for purposes of reproduction and condemn sexual
representations under any circumstances. At the other extreme are
those who concede that sex can and should be recreational but may
nonetheless find some types of representation disturbing. Others
attempt to distinguish between degrees of explicitness.
C. What Does the National Internet Community Find Obscene?
Empirical research on Americans' perception of pornography as
obscenity is scattershot. As of this writing, no nationwide poll of
American Internet users" or Americans generally, regarding their
perception of content qualifying as obscene has been completed. 3
Regardless of the population the Court chooses to use, there is a large
gap in the information available to make a determination of a
national community standard.94
91. Norman Finkel, John E. Burke & Leticia J. Chavez, Commonsense Judgments of
Infanticide: Murder, Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, 6(4) PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 1113-1137 (2000) (examining shifts in community sentiments and
commonsense justice generally).
92. Polling American Internet users may prove to be easier in that the community is
located in one virtual location and responses could be tabulated instantaneously.
Harnessing social networking websites like Facebook and Myspace would allow for access
to a large proportion of the relevant community. According to a nationwide survey of
2,131 U.S. adults surveyed online between April 28 and April 30, 2010, by Harris
Interactive, approximately sixty-four percent of all Americans use social media.
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vaultfHI-Harris-Poll-Opinions-In-Social-Media-2010-06-
03.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2010).
93. The majority of studies found on the subject have asked how individuals feel
about pornography. See supra section III.B. But only the 2007 study out of the University
of Nevada, Reno asked respondents to rate samples of material as "obscene." Alicia
Summers & Monica K. Miller, Obscenity Is a Four Letter Word-Or Is It? An
Investigation into Community Standards of Obscenity (July 3, 2007) (unpublished report)
(on file with the University of Nevada, Reno, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=998192).
94. No research currently addresses whether such a national standard or consensus
exists. However, if the Court is to continue to prosecute obscenity cases under the guise
that it offends community standards, the burden of establishing such a standard should be
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Studies on the acceptance of pornography and community
standards from a sampling of locales across America including:
Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona;" San Francisco, California;9
Corpus Christi, Texas;" Allen County, Ohio;" and Dade County,
Florida"' have found the majority of respondents favored adults
having access to sexually explicit adult material. A 1994 study
reviewed the attitudes of adults in ten states regarding sexually
explicit content in mass media.'1 In each state they reported that
standards had become more acceptable of sexual materials and that
adults have a right to obtain such materials and for adults to see
materials containing exposure of the genitalia and every kind of
sexual activity even in mass media." The only feature of a
community standard that could be found, and still seems to hold
today, is an intolerance for any materials in which children or minors
are involved either as actors, participants, part of production, or
*103viewers.'0
The most recent and relevant study completed on the issue of
content qualifying as obscene is small-scale research undertaken in
placed on the prosecution. Appropriate research is needed in order to apply a national
standard, as discussed infra section III.C. The government should fund such studies to
provide further legitimacy to these prosecutions in the long run.
95. Herrman, M. S. & Bordner, D. C., Attitudes Toward Pornography In a Southern
Community, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 349 (1983).
96. Sowers, C. & James, V. H., Arizonans Back Right To See Adult Films At Home
But Support Porno Crackdown, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 12, 1985, at Al.
97. Schreiner, T. & Lempinen, E., Special Bay Area Poll On Sex, Drugs, Politics, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 1.4.
98. Edelman, B., Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?, 23(1) J.
OF ECON. PERSP. 209 (2009).
99. J. E. Scott, What is Obscene? Social Science And The Contemporary Community
Standard Test Of Obscenity, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 29 (1991); see also, J. E. Scott, et
al, Obscenity And The Law: Can A Jury Apply Contemporary Community Standards In
Determining Obscenity?, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 130 (1990).
100. Scott, supra note 99 at 29. Acceptance of sexually explicit material was seventy-
nine percent in Dade County, Florida.
101. Charles Winick & John T. Evans, Is There A National Standard With Respect To
Attitudes Toward Sexually Explicit Media Material?, 23(4) ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 405 (1994).
102. Id.
103. Terry Frieden, High Court Remands Online Porn Case to Appeals Court, CNN,
May 13, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/05/13/scotus.online.porn/index.html;
Robert Peters, Do Community Standards Exist in the Age of the Internet? July 20, 2004,
http://www.obscenitycrimes.org/InternetCommunityStandards.php; Martin Diamond & J.
E. Dannemiller, Pornography and Community Standards in Hawaii: Comparison with
Other States, 18(6) ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 475 (1989).
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2007 by Alicia Summers and Monica Miller of the University of
Nevada, Reno." Their research model should be implemented on a
larger scale as it would provide helpful guidance in the formation of a
national standard, whether based on the Internet community
standard or the community standard of the American public
generally.
Summers and Miller sought to answer two questions in their
research: First, is there a community standard of obscenity? And
second, are jurors capable of understanding this community
standard?"o' Individuals were given the legal definition of obscenity
and asked to rate how obscene they personally felt that twenty-four
items were, on a scale from one (not at all obscene) to eight (highly
obscene).'0 The least obscene items for individual ratings were art
books with nudity, movies that imply sexual intercourse, and theater
performances with partial female nudity.'" Items ranked moderately
obscene (i.e., scores closest to 4.5) included websites with adult sex
stories, sexually graphic language, and magazines that have pictures
of naked men." Items ranked highly obscene (i.e., scores above
seven) were websites with sexual stories about children, movies with
explicit rape scenes, magazines with images of people having sex with
animals, and movies that portray sex with corpses."
Following the individual ratings of obscenity, participants were
asked to consider how they thought others in their community would
see the items and to rate them again. These ratings were aimed at
determining participants' perceptions of community standards of
obscenity."o Participants' ratings of obscenity were less conservative
than their perceptions of community standards, demonstrating a
pluralistic ignorance bias."' Even though individuals are part of their
104. Summers & Miller, supra note 93.
105. Id. The participants included forty-seven community members from sixteen states
and fifty-four students from a mid-size western university. Participants included twenty-
eight males and seventy-three females. Participants were from rural areas (40.6%),
suburban areas (39.6%), urban areas (15.8%), and metropolitan areas (4%).




110. Id. at 13.
111. Pluralistic ignorance is a cognitive bias in which individuals believe that their
attitudes and behaviors differ from the expressed social norm. Tracy A. Lambert, Arnold
S. Kahn & Kevin J. Apple, Pluralistic Ignorance And Hooking Up, 40(2) THE J. OF SEX
RES. 129 (2003).
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community, they believe their views are different from the
community at large. This misperception of community standards
applied in the criminal context might cause a jury to convict an
individual of an obscenity crime, even if they do not feel he is guilty.
While the Summers and Miller research has its limitations,"2 it
highlights that the assumptions of the Miller test-that community
standards exist and that jurors are capable of understanding them-is
flawed. While this may also mean that a national standard is just as
elusive, until this type of research is undertaken on a grander scale,
the question remains unanswered."'3 Further, individual perceptions
of obscenity do not match perceptions of community standards of
obscenity, an important fact considering the current legal definition
and the proposed "national" definition, rest on "community
standards" as applied by individual jurors. If the courts are to
continue utilizing the Miller test, with or without nationalizing the
relevant community, further research similarly structured to the
Summers and Miller study must be undertaken on a larger scale.
Additionally, the Summers and Miller study tells us that the test for
obscenity, if involving community standards, must provide greater
checks on juror's flawed perceptions of the community standard.
IV. Constitutional Considerations and the Failures of the
Local Standard
If the Miller test is to be maintained and a community must be
defined for obscenity charges against Internet communications, the
adoption of a national Internet community standard is needed. And,
while both the local and national standards have their flaws, as the
Ninth Circuit noted in their Kilbride decision, the "application of
local community standards raises grave constitutional doubts on its
face and application of a national community standard does not,
thereby persuading us to adopt a national community standard to
112. Summers & Miller, supra note 93. Limitations included: 1) the small number of
ethnic minorities in the study and 2) the instrument has never been used before and is thus
lacking in test of reliability and validity. These concerns however would be addressed in
taking this study format and applying it to a larger sample.
113. It is wholly possible that a standard does not exist. However, if that is the case, it
raises greater questions of the involvement of the federal government in regulating this
type of speech generally. This paper presumes that a standard could be divined, and that
the government has a legitimate role in regulating this type of conduct. Others have, with
some merit, proposed that the government exit this realm of speech regulation entirely.
See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 6 THE NEW ATLANTIS 75, available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-end-of-obscenity.
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alleviate the former doubts.",14 However, the Ninth Circuit is correct
in its assertion that the application of a national community standard
may still be subject to a constitutional challenge."'
The court in Kilbride largely relied upon the plurality from
Ashcroft v. ACLU. However, there is a history of skepticism on the
Supreme Court regarding a national community standard for
obscenity. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, Chief Justice Earl Warren in his
dissenting opinion wrote:
[T]here is no provable "national standard" . . . this Court has
not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to
expect local courts to divine one. The use of "national"
standards, however, necessarily implies that materials found
tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria,
will nevertheless be unavailable where they are acceptable."'
Thus, Chief Justice Warren found that the potential for
suppression of speech seems at least as great in the application of a
single nation-wide standard as with a local standard. Nine years later,
the majority in Miller stated "[i]t is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City."" 7 In the same vein,
it may be argued that the First Amendment does not permit the
people of New York or Las Vegas be barred from freely obtaining
works acceptable to them simply because those works would be
intolerable to the people of Maine or Mississippi.
The opinions above reject a national standard without
entertaining the potential benefits and protections it may afford
individual rights. Rather than requesting empirical research be done,
or that Americans' opinions be obtained, the Court merely claimed
that the task is simply too hard. The claim that it is too hard to poll
Americans, particularly in today's technologically advanced society, is
insufficient when weighed against the implications for individual
114. Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1254 n.8.
115. Id.
116. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, J., dissenting).
117. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973); accord Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S.
524, 524-25, (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 434 (1970)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 434-35, (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S.
319, 319 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 319-20, (Harlan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 581-83. (1973).
[Vol. 38:1250 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
rights involved in obscenity prosecutions."8  The three major
constitutional concerns with the current Miller test are notice, forum
shopping, and the chilling effect on speech. As discussed below, the
local community standard falls victim to all three constitutional issues.
The national Internet community standard would potentially solve
two of these problems and fall victim only to the potential chilling
effect.
A. Notice
Applying a varying community standard regime to the Internet
raises a serious constitutional problem of notice. No Internet
publisher could possibly anticipate the community standards of every
place in the nation. This problem is even worse for Web publishing
than for national distributors of magazine, videocassette, and DVD
pornography because there is no way to geographically restrict the
Web. Because "community standards" is a phrase in a jury
instruction, and is not something one can look up in the library for a
local definition, its effect in obscenity cases is unpredictable.
Some maintain"' that adequate notice exists under the Miller test
because it only encompasses depictions of "hard-core sexual conduct"
specifically defined under applicable law: "Under the holdings
announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or
exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or
describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are
satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a
dealer in such materials. . . ."'20 In other words, those who wish to
publish sexually explicit works without triggering obscenity laws
supposedly have a reasonably clear line to govern their work, which is
to avoid publishing explicit depictions of ultimate sexual acts,
masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals
in such a way that a reasonable jury could find that it appeals to the
prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious social
value. 21
However, the definition of "hard core" set out in Miller has
shifted, and prosecutors around the country have applied differing
118. The punishment for a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1466 is imprisonment for not more
than 5 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1466(a).
119. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
120. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
121. Id. at 25.
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standards in determining what they will and will not prosecute.122
Further, the trend at the federal level has been away from prosecuting
obscenity as a stand alone crime, and towards prosecuting obscenity
when attached to public nuisances like spam e-mail.'2 Recently, the
government has focused on extreme material including sexual
violence, defecation material, and material involving children.24
Short of those three broad categories, there is little consistency in
how individuals are singled out for prosecution. Without consistency
and explicit guidelines, an adult entertainment producer has
insufficient notice of what activities will result in prosecution. By
utilizing a national standard, with explicit guidelines, the guessing
game of obscenity is removed.1  Where clear guidelines are set out,
individuals can conform their behavior accordingly. As Ira Isaacs, a
producer of controversial adult material summed it up, "[t]his is the
122. Deputy City Attorney from Los Angeles, Deborah Sanchez, discussed offensive
elements she uses to define what is prosecutable under obscenity law ("CURBFHP").
The "C" stands for "children involved." The "U" is for urination or defecation in
conjunction with sex acts. The "R" is for rape scenes. The "B" is for bestiality. The "F"
is fisting or foot insertion. The "H" is for homicide or dismemberment in conjunction with
the sex act. And the "P" is for severe infliction of pain. INTERVIEW DEBORAH
SANCHEZ, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/interviews/sanchez.html
(last visited Sep. 29, 2010).
123. Matt Richtel, What's Obscene? Google Could Have an Answer, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/technology/24iht-24obscene.13934221.html.
In the last eight years, the Justice Department has brought roughly fifteen obscenity cases
that have not involved child pornography, compared with seventy-five during the Reagan
and first Bush administrations.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Penn.
2003); United States v. Corbett, (S.D. W.V. 2003) (The progress of Corbett is unclear, but
parties were indicted on April 9, 2003. Corbett's Web site offered for sale and delivery,
via the U.S. mail, a total of fifty-three video tapes and DVDs, fofty minutes to two hours
in length, depicting graphic and sexually explicit scenes of defecation and urination); see
also 18 U.S.C. §H 2251 et seq. ("Priority has been given during this administration to cases
involving the use of minors in producing pornography and cases involving the interstate or
foreign shipment of material depicting minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct");
Memorandum for all United States Attorneys from Eric G. Holder, Jr., Prosecutions
Under the Federal Obscenity Statutes, June 10, 1998, available at http://www.justice.gov/
dag/readingroom/obscen.htm. Jeffrey Douglas, a Santa Monica lawyer who represents the
adult industry, has tracked nationwide obscenity prosecutions since 1987. He found that
of the materials that have been judged obscene-by a judge or a jury-there are several
common elements: explicit showing of excretion, bestiality, necrophilia, incest, or any type
of non-consensual sex. OBSCENITY-LEGAL INFORMATION FOR ADULT WEBSITE
WEBMASTERS, http://www.adultweblaw.com/laws/obscene.htm (last visited Sep. 29, 2010).
125. The empirical research proposed supra in section III.C would provide clear,
categorical guidelines of what type of behavior, when depicted, would fall into the
category of obscenity. This is more notice and guidance than the current amorphous
definition of "prurient" which is then modified by individual communities.
only crime you don't know you did until the jury tells you you did
it."126
B. Forum Shopping
Varying community standards encourages forum shopping by
government prosecutors. Forum shopping is problematic in light of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.127 Forum shopping by
prosecutors offends the sense of justice, particularly if the fair
resolution of a case hinges on technical differences from one
jurisdiction to the next, as it does in obscenity. The ability of the
government to choose where to bring a trial in a world of varying
community standards places web publishers of sexually explicit
material in the position of being prosecuted in all fifty states, with a
seemingly infinite number of community standards. Some argue that
web publishers have availed themselves to every forum in which their
materials can be accessed. Generally speaking, individuals that "do
business" over the Internet can expect to be subject to jurisdiction in
any state in which such sales are conducted. The key that has
emerged is "targeting"-if a publisher has not specifically targeted its
content toward a specific state, it should not be held to be subject to
the jurisdiction and law of that state consistent with due process of
law.'28 While it could be argued that adult websites have targeted all
adults in the United States, unlike businesses selling tangible products
online prosecuted for tort liability under codified standards, providers
of adult materials are being judged by an undefined local standard.
Under the current Miller test, the "local community standard" is
determined by twelve randomly selected jurors who construct their
own community's standard. While this could hypothetically work in
favor of a defendant, it is highly unlikely as the party bringing the suit
selects the forum and the prosecution may take advantage of
localities with demographics that research has found to have more
126. Joe Mozingo, Obscenity Task Force's Aim Disputed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/09/local/me-obscene9. Ira Isaac's case is currently
pending on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
128. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1035
(2003); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). A California couple was
convicted under a Tennessee obscenity statute for making available on their California
website photographs found to be obscene under Tennessee law, where the community
standards (the relevant legal test) differed greatly from California. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, finding that defendant had approved applications for
"membership" to the website, thereby explicitly approving transmissions into Tennessee
or other users' locations.
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conservative tastes.12 A national standard would prevent forum
shopping, and increase consistency in application of obscenity law to
Internet communications.
C. Chilling Effects
Varying community standards as applied to Internet obscenity
chills speech.'" Of course, any meaningful obscenity standard, if
enforced, is likely to chill speech to some degree. However the
geographic "local community" standard would chill speech protected
in some jurisdictions at the service of locations with more stringent
standards of speech and would adversely affect the free-market of
ideas supported by members of the Court in the past. While the
Supreme Court held in Sable Communications that "[t]here is no
constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications
that are obscene in some communities under local standards even
though they are not obscene in others,""' this argument misses the
point in the context of Internet speech. The Court premised their
reasoning in Sable on the ability of the defendant, a provider of adult
telephone messages, to screen the area-code origin of incoming calls
through caller ID. While technically feasible in the telephone
medium, such an approach will not work on the Internet. The
Internet works on a different dynamic, one that allows any user to
place or retrieve information within its realm. Because no individual
can control with absolute assurance who will access information
placed on the Internet based on location, the reasoning the Court
fashioned in Sable to allow the application of individual community
standards would be so vague as to irreparably chill speech. While the
application of a national standard would not eradicate the risk of
chilled speech, it will serve to provide notice, consistency and fairness
where there currently is none. If anything, then, wouldn't a national
standard provide fair notice, but at the same time, clearly have a more
chilling effect on free speech? Speech at the extreme may be
impacted with a national standard, but not more so than it currently is
under the local community standard.
129. See, e.g., Robert Peters, Do Community Standards Exist in the Age of the
Internet?, Morality in Media, Inc., July 20, 2004, http://www.obscenitycrimes.org/
InternetCommunityStandards.php; see also Summers & Miller, supra note 93.
130. See, e.g., Nitke v. Ashcroft, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Barbara Nitke, a
New York photographer who works with erotic subject matter, challenged the
constitutionality of being hauled into court in the least tolerant jurisdiction, arguing that
this could chill protected speech throughout the Internet.
131. Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1988).
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V. Crafting and Applying a National Obscenity Standard
Even top prosecutors acknowledge the difficulty in prosecuting
under the Miller test.132 Bruce Taylor, a prosecutor with the U.S.
Department of Justice, who has prosecuted more than 700 obscenity
cases in his prosecutorial career, stated that "knowing automatically
what the community standard is, is maybe not as universal any
more." 133  Accordingly, new research must be undertaken, as
discussed above in section III.C. That research, paired with a
standard designed specifically for Internet users, eliminates any
vagueness due to ambiguity. Unlike the local community standard,
purveyors of explicit content online would know the standard
applicable to the entire Internet and could effectively tailor the
content of their websites to conform to that standard.'- The
operators would not need to know from where the users were
accessing and would not need technology to block out certain
jurisdictions. In conformance with the Due Process Clause, the
proposed standard provides a clearer, more precise standard for what
is acceptable over the Internet.
The proposed modification of the Miller Test for Internet
prosecutions is as follows:
(1) Whether a reasonable American Internet user would find
that the work, taken as a whole, is patently offensive and appeals to
the prurient interest;
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state or
federal law;
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
While facially the only major change is the phrasing of the first
prong, the information provided to jurors would be consistent, and
judges would all provide the same jury instructions on the matter.
The reason the Kilbride decision happened was because there was
little clarity on the relevant community. By specifying the community
in the first prong, the question is removed. The first and second
prongs would be left to a jury, as they were in Pope. However, in the
proposed standard, the local jury would be instructed regarding the
132. INTERVIEW BRUCE TAYLOR, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/porn/interviews/taylor.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
133. Id.
134. Similarly, providers of adult content have created warning pages with age
verification requests to comply with clearly established standards.
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American Internet community, including the nature of the Internet,
pornography standards on the Internet, ability to prohibit access, and
any other pertinent information. This could be accomplished by
presenting the results of national research such as the study proposed
in section III.C, and expert witness testimony as to what standard
applies to the Internet community."' The third prong would still be
left for the judge. This provides a check on juries who fail to
adequately apply the national standard. Further, judges can be
trained on what the current national Internet community standard is
and they too will also have a better grasp on what the applicable state
and federal laws are. By creating clear-cut instructions and training
judges on the relevant standards, this will help to ensure that juries
across the country are making determinations under the same
standards. The appeals process serves as a third check on potential
inconsistency across jurisdictions and juries. This change in the
language of the tests and the application of the process will help
federal judges be consistent in their determinations and promote the
goals of due process and notice.
The proposed standard conforms to past precedent. The courts
have traditionally refused to tolerate a result whereby "the
constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with
state lines.""' The Miller justification for a local community standard
was that the nation was too expansive and too diverse to expect a
single standard.' The local standard was implemented because, at
the time, communities all over the country had different tastes and
values.' These different, isolated communities do not exist on the
Internet. All of the users are part of the same community.
Furthermore, with modern technology, people communicate and
interact with other people from all over the country instantaneously
135. Even the Harmling Court stated that the district court was free to admit evidence
of standards existing in places outside of the forum district if such evidence would help
decide the issue. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106.
136. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1964) (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
137. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court stated that application of the
Miller test is a question of fact to be decided by a jury in the location where trial is
brought. The Court further stated that the United States is too big and too diverse to have
a single standard. While the court system historically permits triers of fact to draw on the
standards of their community, requiring states to structure obscenity proceedings around a
national 'community standard' would be impractical. See id. "People in different States
vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity." Id. at 33.
138. Id.
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as if the country were one single community, thereby diminishing the
past perceived need for local community standards.
Conclusion
The Internet and technological advancements have pushed the
Miller Test to its limit. The application of local community standards
to the Internet, an amorphous, virtual community that transcends
lines drawn on maps, is inappropriate. The result has been the
inconsistent prosecution of individuals and speech being held to the
standards of the least tolerant community. The current local standard
fails to provide individuals with notice, it allows for forum shopping
and it chills speech. The adoption of a national standard addresses
the first two failures of the local standard. If the Miller Test is to
remain in use for the Internet, a national standard must be adopted.
However, the creation of that standard requires extensive research on
a national scale to fill the information gap that currently exists. Once
that research has been completed, it can be integrated into the
proposed modification of the Miller Test for Internet communication.
Jurors could harness that information in making their determinations
of what is patently offensive and appealing to the prurient interest
from the national Internet user community's perspective. Meanwhile,
judges will serve as a check on juror determinations, ensuring that the
national standard was applied fairly and jurors did not improperly
bias the standard with their own perception of the obscene.
Ultimately, if the Miller Test is to survive in the Twenty-First
Century, it needs to be adjusted for the Internet and empirical
research on what American Internet users find to be obscene must be
undertaken.
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